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A year or two ago, one of my copyright students called
to my attention a problem that seemed to him to pose
unique difficultiesfor the copyright statute. The problem arises because of a technology called digital sampling.' Digital sampling is a new threat to performers'
rights that has grown out of the combination of digital
recording technology with music synthesizer technology. This threat is a very recent one. Indeed, the
digital sampling problem is so new that copyright lawyers haven't yet figured out how to think about it.
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Digital Sampling
Digital recording technology enables one to recora
a sound and encode it digitally in computer memory,
which can then reproduce the sound absolutely faithfully.A digital sample is a very short digital recording,
only a few seconds long, that is analyzed and stored
in the memory of a computer. Older synthesizer technology enabled a computer to create music from
computer-generatedsound waves, although the result
sounded a little metallic. If you plug a digital sample
of a sound into a synthesizer, though, you can create
music that sounds as if it's being played by the person
who made the sound you recorded. Manufacturers
have created products called sampling keyboards that
combine the two technologies. And, over the last year
or two, music created by using digital samples along
with synthesizer technology has been showing up as
backup music on many commercially released records.
It's easy to see why. Using samples is less expensive
and less trouble than hiring real performers.
Record producers are increasingly sampling the
sounds of musicians they record to build up their libraries of sounds. And music created from these samples shows up on other recordings, and in the music
for television programs or commeraals, often without
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the sampled performer's knowledge or consent. Meanwhile, samples of commercially successful musicians'
performances have become available in sample libraries and on the black market. Musicians with home
recording studios are using the samples in their
recordings.
This c e r t a d y seems to be the sort of situation that
ought to give rise to a legal remedy. A performer's
performance has all of the attributes of personality
that we instinctively expect to receive legal protection.
Although it may not be tangible, it smells like property. Using the performance without the performeis
consent smells llke a tort. Legal protection of performances is nonetheless murky, and it isn't clear how
the law would approach unauthorized use of digital
samples.
Recently, the Copyright Law Society of Japan asked
me to give a lecture comparing the rights of performers
under Japanese and U.S. law. I decided to examine
how the laws of both countries would treat the problems posed by the widespread commercial use of digital sampling. The United States and Japan take different approaches to protection of performers' rights.
Notwithstanding those differences, the commercial
use of dgital sampling poses similar challenges
to U.S. and Japanese law.

Performers' Rights in the
United States
Performers in the United States can seek protection
under a variety of federal and state legal theories.
The obvious place to start exploring the protection of
performers' rights is the federal copyright statute.
The U.S. copyright statute defines copyrightable
subject matter very broadly. Performers' performances
are entitled to copyright protection as soon as they are
fixed in tangible form. Sound recordings are copyrightable; and the performers' performances are part of the
original authorship that entitles sound recordings to
copyright protection. Audiovisual works and films
are copyrightable; and the performers' performances
are part of the original authorship that entitles those
works to copyright protection. The copyright statute
gives authors very strong economic rights, including
exclusive rights of reproduction, adaptation, distribution and public performance.
As a theoretical matter, then, United States copyright law could offer performers very strong economic
rights in their performances. As a practical matter,
however, performers can almost never claim rights
under the copyright statute. The reason for this is
our "work made for hire" doctrine. The United States
probably has the most expansive work made for
hire doctrine in the world. It provides that any work
created by an employee in the course of her employment is a work made for hire, and that the employer is
the work's legal author. Copyright in that work, then,
vests in the employer upon fixation. The reason that
performers can never claim rights under the copyright
statute is that virtually all copyrightable works that
embody performances are works made for hire.
Almost all sound recordings, films, and television programs made in the United States are made under contracts that expressly provide that the performers' contributions are works made for hire. The bottom line is
that although the copyright statute gives the copyright
owner the exclusive right to make reproductions of all
copyrighted works, and the exclusive right to make
public performances of copyrighted audiovisual
works, the performer whose performance is embodied
in these works is not the copyright owner and cannot
exercise these exclusive rights.

Rights in Unfixed Performances:State Common Law
Federal statutory copyright does not vest in a work
until the moment it is fixed in tangible form. There is
no federal statutory copyright in performances that
have not yet been fixed. Thus, federal law does not

protect the exclusive right to record a live performance. The only source for protection for unrecorded
performances is the laws of the 50 states. Indeed,
the federal copyright statute expressly preserves the
power of the states to protect works that have not yet
been fixed in tangible form. So far, however, few states
have exercised that power. Only one state, the state of
California, has a statute that gives protection to works
that have not been fixed in tangible form. No cases
have been decided under that statute. A handful of
other states can be found that offered common law
protection to unfixed works of authorship before the
1976 federal Copyright Act preempted state protection
of fixed works and preserved state protection of unfixed works. In theory, such protection should remain
available after the effective date of the 1976 Copyright
Act. But, in the nearly 10 years since the 1976 Act took
effect, no case has been reported in which plaintiff recovered for infringement of common law copyright
in an unfixed work or performance. So although the
possibility of state law protection of unfixed performances exists in theory, the right of first fixation has
not yet received protection from state courts.

The Right of Publicity
Performers have another source of rights under state
law. That source is the right of publicity. In the United
States, the right of publicity protects a celebrity from
misappropriation of her name or likeness for commercial purposes. The right of publicity has also been
used by performers to protect their performances. In
states that recognize the right of publicity, performers
have a tool that will allow some of them to prevent the
unauthorized commercial exploitation of their unfixed
performances, either by reproduction or broadcast
communication. Indeed, performers have succeeded
in some courts in recovering not only for unauthorized
use of their performances but also for unauthorized imitation of their performances. And courts have been
tending to interpret the right of publicity with increasing breadth. Nonetheless, most courts require the
claimed invasion of the right of publicity to involve a
recognizable appropriation of a widely recognized
feature of plaintiff's "identity."
Because the right of publicity is a creature of state
law, it varies from state to state. Some states interpret
it very broadly; others interpret it narrowly; and still
others refuse to recognize it at all. The most vexing
characteristic of the right of publicity is the wide

variations in the scope of the doctrine among the
several states.
Can the right of publicity be invoked by performers
to protect the rights that they are unable to claim under
the copyright act because they are employees for hire?
The answer appears to be no. Courts have considered
claims by celebrities that broadcasting of their performances by their employer and without their consent violates their right to publicity. Recently, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that so
long as the performance of the employees was fixed
in tangble form, the right of publicity claim was preempted by the federal copyright statute.*The court
reasoned that the right of publicity being asserted was
equivalent to a right of public performance in performances that had been created and fixed within the
context of the employment relationshp. The copyright
statute vests the right of public performance in the employer, and preempts laws under which the employee
could claim ownershp of essentially equivalent rights.

Section 43{0) of the Lanhom Act
United States law has another source for protection
of performers' rights that I want to mention briefly:
it has assumed increasing importance in United States
intellectual property law. That source is section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act, a statutory section tucked in at the
end of our federal trademark statute that courts have
interpreted to establish a federal statutory tort of unfair
competition. The gravamen of a cause of action under
section 43(a) is that defendant has confused or misled
the purchasing public about the nature or source of defendant's goods or services. Section 43(a) sometimes
offers performers a remedy for claims that are not
otherwise actionable. For example, Woody Allen's
right of publicity suit against a Woody Allen lookalike
was unsuccessful, but he prevailed a ainst the lookalike in a claim based on section 43(a). In another case,
the singer Charlie Rich successfully relied on section
43(a) to enjoin the re-release of a 10 year old sound
recording of his performance with a current photograph of him on the record j a ~ k e tAn
. ~ advantage of
section 43(a) is that it is part of a federal statute rather
than a creature of state law, so it is immune from
federal preemption.
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I have briefly described four possible sources for performers' rights under United States law: the federal
copyright statute, under which performers, as em-

ployees, have no rights; state common law copyright
which, in theory, gives performers a right of first fixation and, in practice, does not appear to exist; the right
of publicity, which offers performers a pastiche of inconsistent rights; and section 43(a), which offers performers who can prove public confusion the possibility
of parasitic recovery based on the confusion. None of
these legal doctrines was designed with performers'
rights in mind. Performers who seek protection under
them find that the situations they complain of fit into
these doctrines very poorly. For that reason, most performers have looked to the labor unions that represent
them to secure through collective bargaining the rights
that the law has failed to provide. The labor unions
that represent performers are relatively weak, and
have not been very successful in their attempts to
negotiate stronger rights for their membership.

Performers' Neigh
- boring
Rights in Japan
The situation in Japan is very different. The
copyright law of Ja an follows the model of many
European nations: copyright vests, without any
formal requirements, in works of authorship within
designated subject matter categories. Performers'
performances are not so designated and, thus, are not
themselves subject matter entitled to copyright protection. Sound recordings that embody performances
of music are not copyrightable. Films are entitled to
copyright, but the authorship embodied in a film or
audiovisual work includes only the production, direction, art direction and photography, and not the performers' performances.
Japanese law protects performers by gving them
"neighboring rights" (chosaku-rinsetsuken) that
are independent of and different from the copyright
granted to author^.^ The Japanese neighboring rights
were modeled on the provisions of the Rome Convention of 1961,~and give performers very strong rights
in their unfixed, live performances, including an unqualified right to authorize or forbid the recording of
their live
Performers' rights in performances once those performances have been fixed in tangble form are much
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weaker. The statute gives performers a very limited
reproduction right over performances that have
already been recorded or filmed.9Performers also
have a nominal right to equitable remuneration for
commercial broadcasts of their fixed performances,'0
and a limited public lending right.''
These rights are far narrower than their United
States analogues. But they are essentially inalienable.
Moreover, a performer's employment status does not
affect them. Japanese law does not presume that all
fruits of an employee's creative endeavor belong to her
employer. Instead, the Japanese provisions for neighboring rights expressly preserve a limited set of rights
in performers, whether employed or not. Nor do
neighboring rights depend on a particular performer's
fame or her audience's confusion.

I have outlined the overall shape of United States
and Japanese legal doctrine for the protection of performers. How do these doctrines apply to digital
sampling?

Digital Sampling Under
U.S. Law
The first instinct of American music lawyers when
their clients came to them and complained that their
performances were showing up on other people's records was to think about a copyright infringement suit.
They immediately ran into problems figuring out how
to think about it.
Suppose, for example, that the digtal sound sample
was taken with the performer's consent, but outside of
the context of an employment relationship. Perhaps a
fellow musician recorded it when playing around with
her equipment. Using the sample in other recordings
might violate the performer's copyright rights to reproduce the woxk and to prepare derivative works, but
only if the digital sound sample were copyrightable.
And here we run into problems. First of all, a digital
sound sample is itself probably too short to be
copyrightable. The Copyright Office assimilates digital
samples to other uncopyrightable building blocks of
copyrightable expression: single words, brief phrases,
discrete items of data or short dance steps. If the digtal
sound sample is uncopyrightable, then it is not copyright infringement to exploit it in other recordings.
Even if the sample were held to be entitled to a copyright, there are further obstacles. Under the U.S. copyright statute, the copyright owner is entitled to prohibit any duplication of a sound recording, but may
not prohibit imitation of it.12We talk about this as a
"dubbing" right: it covers record piracy and off-the-air
recording, but not sound-alike records. And it is simply not clear whether a United States court would hold
that creating a sound recording through the use of digital sound samples is a use that involves duplication,
rather than mere imitation. A defense lawyer could
argue that imitation is the essence of digital sampling:
a computer analyzes the attributes of a sound wave,
stores its characteristics in computer memory, and
then uses synthesizer technology to imitate the sound.
If courts assimilate the use of digital samples to imitation rather than duplication, then the creation of new
recordings from those samples would not be copyright
infringement.
Consider, instead, a situation in which the sample
is taken from a copyrighted sound recording. We have
some of the same problems, and some additional hurdles as well. If the sample is taken from a copyrighted
sound recording, the sound recording is copyrightable, but the copyright doesn't belong to the performer
because the sound recording is a work made for hire.
Assuming that there were a way over that hurdle, a
copyright infringement action might fail on the ground
that the accused recording was not substantially similar to the original sound recording, or that the amount
taken was de minimis. After all, the sample is merely a
few seconds long. The bottom line is that U.S. federal

copyright law offers little protection of substance to the
performer who has authorized the fixation of a digtal
sound sample of her performance.
What about bootleggmg, or unauthorized h a t i o n ?
State common law copyright might protect a performer
whose live performance has been surreptitiously sampled. But there are no cases out there to look at, and it
is entirely possible that states would find arguments
that sound samples are mere building b!ocks and not
protectable works of authorship to be compelling.
This brings us to the right of publicity. The right
of publicity should protect performers from unauthorized commercial exploitation of their performances; so it would seem a perfect remedy. There are
nonetheless significant obstacles to recovery. First,
a sound recording may use music generated from a
digtal sample of a performer's performance, without
being widely recogruzable. Most courts deny recovery
for unrecognizable uses of plaintiff's likeness or identity; those courts would surely deny recovery for unrecognizable uses of plaintiff's performance. Secondly,
most jurisdictions privilege "incidental use" of names
and likeness, that is, use for purposes other than taking advantage of the celebrity's reputation or prestige.
Where the incidental use privilege is broad, the sort of
appropriation involved in unauthorized use of digital
sound samples would fall within it. Finally, there is the
problem of preemption. If the performer has authorized the sample's fixation in tangble form, state law
causes of action for use of the sample would likely be
preempted by the federal copyright statute.
This brings us to section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,
and a ray of hope for the performer. Although there
have as yet been no cases decided under section 43(a)
on analogous facts, courts have interpreted it expansively, and used it to make otherwise unactionable
wrongs actionable. So long as consumers are not confused as to the provenance of sounds on recordings
or programs, section 43(a) ought not to provide a
remedy. Courts, however, have been generous recently in finding the requisite likelihood of confusion,
and quick to respond to impressions of misappropriation with injunctions.
No 43(a) suit has yet been filed. In the face of gloomy
prognoses from their attorneys, performers aggrieved
by the use of digital sound samples of their performances in commercial sound recordings have tried to
persuade their union to pursue the issue. Thus far,
however, the union has failed to do so.
Why is U.S. law so inhospitable to claims for this
sort of injury? United States protection of intellectual

Digital Sampling
Under Japanese Law
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property is based on an economic incentive model
rather than a natural rights model of personality. The
bare fact that someone created something does not suffice to entitle that person to legal rights in her creation.
Instead, U.S. law offers property rights as incentives
for creation and concentrates those rights in the hands
of those entities most likely to exploit them. A performer's voice, or trumpet tone, is not something that
the law envisions as more likely to be "created" if incentives are available. Nor would giving performers
property rights in their performances facilitate exploitation. Indeed, the multiplicity of ownership that
would result from giving property rights to each performer in any given performance would significantly
raise the transaction costs involved in the transfer and
exploitation of those rights. Because unrestricted digital sampling neither interferes with incentives for creation nor burdens the exploitation of protected works,
it may not invade any interests that U.S. law was
designed to protect.

Japanese law embodies an approach that derives
from natural rights, and expressly recognizes rights in
performers. One might therefore expect it to be more
favorable to performers than its U.S. counterpart. Indeed, under Japanese law, performers are in a somewhat stronger position. Their statutory neighboring
rights give them a right to prohibit unauthorized fixation of their performances, and a right to prevent
duplication of unauthorized fixations. If taking a digital sound sample of a performance is deemed to be a
recording of that
an unauthorized sample should violate performers' neighboring rights, and
any reproduction of that sample should also be a violation. There are. nonetheless. significant
hurdles that
"
performers must overcome. ' ~ o t w i t h s t a n d i nthe
~ fact
that Japanese law approaches issues of performers'
rights differently from the United States, the obstacles
performers face-in recovering for unauthorized uses
of digital samples are similar.
First of all, as in the U.S., it isn't entirely clear that
a recording as short as a digital sound sample would
constitute a reproduction of a performance. Second,
even if a digital sound sample were deemed a
reproduction of a performance, it is not completely
clear that a new recording that incorporates music
created from the sound sample would also be deemed
a reproduction of the performance. Finally, taking and
using a digital sound sample might be exempt under
the Japanse statute's provisions permitting short, attributed quotations from performances if consistent
with fair dealing.13
If the perfor&s have consented to the sample, then in addition to these hurdles we have a problem of ownership. Under the Japanese neighboring
rights provisions, the unqualified reproduction right
would belong to the producers of the phonograms,
which, under the statutory definition would seem to
be whoever recorded the s a m ~ 1 e .Performers
l~
could
prevent the sample's use in other sound recordings
only in very limited situations. These would be weak
rights, but they would be stronger rights than are currently available to performers in the United States.
Why is Japanese law not more favorable to performers aggrieved by the unauthorized use of digital sound
samples? Although Japanese law takes a natural rights
approach to performers' rights, and accords performers rights that are essentially inalienable, it defines
those rights restrictively. Indeed, because the rights
are inalienable and may be owned by a multiplicity of
persons who may have conflicting interests, it is necessary that they be narrow in scope. Because digital sampling involves a new technology, it is difficult to predict whether it is encompassed within the restrictive
language of Japan's neighboring rights provisions.

Japanese performers face, for different reasons,
mar.y of the same obstacles as performers face
under U.S. law.

Conclusion
Both the United States and Japan offer performers
rights, but they are weak rights. Japan is more
solicitous of performers than is the United States, but
the development of new technology has outstripped
the legal provisions in both nations' laws. United
States law in this area has set its highest priority as
facilitating the transfer and exploitation of rights by
concentrating their ownership in the hands of few
people: hence, our adherence to the work made for
hire doctrine, which vests copyright in almost all performances in the performers' employer. Japan has
been more willing to tolerate plurality of ownership,
and the resulting restraints on alienation and exploitation of rights. But the development of digital sampling
techniques strains the provisions made for performers'
rights under both systems, because the way that performances may be exploited no longer fits comfortably
within the language of either of our laws.
The Rome Coizvention, upon which Japan's neighboring rights provisions are based, is only a first step in
protecting the rights of performers, and is already
outdated. The provisions of the Rome Convention are,
nonetheless, more generous to performers than current U.S. law. The United States is unlikely to join the
Rome Convention and unlikely to amend its law to conform with the convention's terms.15 Performers' protection in the United States, then, is likely to continue
to be based on a collection of diverse and sometimes
inconsistent legal theories, providing a system of uneven and often unpredictable rights and remedies.
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film, the performer may prevent the reproduction of that performance in a sound recording, but not in another audiovisual
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94. If the fixed performance is, instead, embodied in a sound
recording, the performer may prevent a reproduction of the
sound recording for a purpose completely different from the
purpose for which the performer consented to the original h a tion. Although the right to reproduce phonograms belongs to
the phonogram producer, at least one court has apparently enforced the reproduction right at a performer's behest. See Hamasake v. Ishiyama Kaden K.K., Tokkyo To IGgyo, Jan. 1979, p.64
(Tokyo Dist. Ct. Nov. 8, 1978), discussed in T. Doi, supra note
15, at 242.
10. Copyright Law art. 95. In Japan, the individual performers never
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for activities that benefit performers, and disburses the rest of
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their operating budgets.
11. Copyright Law art. 95bis.
12. 17 U.S.C. sec. 114(b)(1982).
13. See Copyright Law arts. 32,48, 102.
14. See Copyright Law art. 2, paragraph (1) (vi).
15. Notwithstanding the inadequacy of United States law on issues
of performers' rights, it appears very unlikely that the United
States will accede to the Rome Convention. Because broadcasting
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rights under the copyright statute, they are unlikely to support
accession to Rome. Performers alone are insufficiently powerful
political players to command congressional attention. The most
recent effort to expand performers' rights under the copyright
statute, the proposal to establish a performance right in sound
recordings, languished in Congress despite the support of the
Copyright Office. See Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and
the Administration of Justice, of the House Judiciary Comm.,
Performance Rights in Sound Recordings (Committee Print
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